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I. INTRODUCTION
When most people imagine the process of contract formation, they
picture two people sitting down and negotiating, arguing about particular
contract provisions and particular contract terminology, and maybe even
* J.D., expected May 2009, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to
thank Mark for his endless support and understanding through these many years. I would also
like to thank the MI7LR staff for their editorial support.
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involving attorneys to draft an "official" version of the contract.
Regardless of the specific details people imagine, traditional contract
formation generally involves some form of negotiation between two
parties where they choose one set of terms over another. In modem
society, however, such negotiation happens very rarely.' People enter into
many contracts on a daily basis, for example, when they purchase goods
or services online.2 Online purchases are governed by computers, which
do not allow for dickering. That is, it is simply not possible to negotiate
with a computer, as computers can only respond with pre-programmed
terms. Despite this limitation, traditional contracting is not dying-it
simply has to be rethought to accommodate this digital architecture.
II. MOVING TRADITIONAL DICKERING TO THE INTERNET
A. The Traditional Sales Process
The traditional consumer sales process generally involves two par-
ties: a person who wants to purchase goods or services ("consumer") and
a person who wants to provide these goods or services ("seller"). Both
consumer and seller know they want to get to some end-making the
purchase or achieving the sale. To complete the sale, the parties negotiate
particular sales terms. The process of negotiation necessarily entails
flexibility, with give and take by each party. Flexibility inherently means
that there are options when it comes to terms and at least one party
knows in advance about these options. The seller, for example, generally
knows about the different types of warranties available (e.g., three-year
warranty with either at-home repair or ship-out repair) and can educate
the consumer. Since, in this transaction, the seller knows about these op-
tions in advance, there is no reason why the range of options cannot be
provided to consumers purchasing items online. In fact, warranty options
are already being provided to users making purchases online.' So, while
traditional contracting, where two people sit down and discuss terminol-
I. See James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of Contracting Out, 48
Loy. L. REV. 53, 53-55 (2002).
2. In 2006, online sales in the United States were over $100 billion and expected to be
over $108 billion for 2007. See Editorial, 'Net's Benefit, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 11,
2007, at A 12.
3. Sears.com, for example, offers a "PurchaseProtect Plan" or a "Maintenance Agree-
ment" which is basically an extended warranty that offers replacement coverage for a number
of years. Thus, a customer purchasing an Altect Lansing Surround Sound Theater System may
also purchase the Sears PurchaseProtect Plan for an additional $30. This plan offers two years
replacement coverage for the Altec brand name but 3 years replacement coverage for the
Craftsmen and Kenmore brands. See Sears, Protection Agreements, http://www.sears.comlshcl
s/nb_ 10153_12605_NB ProtectionAgreements (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
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ogy, cannot be recreated online, technology is available which would
allow businesses to provide the major component of negotiated con-
tracts: options.
B. The Online Sales Process
Just like the traditional sales process, online sales also involve con-
sumers and sellers. In the online context, however, there is an
intermediary facilitating the sale: the computer. Sellers must create a
website on the Internet that consumers can visit. To sell items, sophisti-
cated sellers, such as Wal-Mart or Dell, have technically complicated
shopping carts that are integrated with merchant processing companies
(e.g., AuthorizeNet), the United States Postal Service, and often a host of
4other companies. In addition, they generally have large database servers
processing information in milliseconds. Integrating all of these compo-
nents requires much skill from computer programmers and systems
engineers, and a significant investment on the part of companies.
1. Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements
For consumers, however, the purchasing process appears quite sim-
ple. Consumers neither see nor are aware of the sophisticated technology
used to support a seller's website. When a consumer visits a retailer's
website, the consumer generally picks out an item, checks a couple of "I
Agree" boxes (without reading the agreement), enters the necessary
credit card information and is finished.
When visiting or purchasing from a website, consumers accept a
predetermined set of terms, commonly referred to as boilerplate "click-
wrap"5 or "browsewrap" agreements. 6 Clickwrap agreements generally
require consumers to click on an "I Agree" button, while browsewrap
4. See Morwenna Marshall, Teradata Shows Its Muscle, II DATABASE PROGRAMMING
& DESIGN $40(3) (1998) (In 1998, Wal-Mart had the "[Ilargest known centralized decision-
support database based on number-of-rows metric: 50 billion rows." At that time, their "ware-
house contain[ed] 65 weeks of inventory and sales data collected nightly from the cash
register scanners in some 3,000 stores. This data, representing 50,000 to 80,000 items, is
grouped at each store by item, number sold, store location, price, and date before being sent
by satellite to the Arkansas-based centralized warehouse. It is then housed in a 700GB table
containing more than five billion rows.").
5. RADIN ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 793-94
(2d ed. 2005) (defining "clickwrap" agreements as those "in which the terms of the agreement
are displayed on the computer screen and the computer user is requested to click an on-screen
button to indicate assent to the displayed terms").
6. id. at 794 (explaining "browsewrap" agreements: "Some websites disclose the exis-
tence of terms governing use of the site with nothing more than a link on the home page
labeled 'Terms of Use.'" The website owner intends that this notice will indicate to the user,
"[b]y continuing to use this site you agree to a set of terms which you will only see if you
choose to click on this link.").
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agreements do not even require that much effort. In fact, consumers have
to make an affirmative effort to seek out the terms of a browsewrap
agreement. Thus, even if the consumers making these online purchases
wanted to negotiate the clickwrap or browsewrap terms, current website
architecture prohibits a negotiation process from taking place.
2. Selecting Options During the Purchasing Process
While consumers cannot currently select contract terms, they are
making other choices during their purchasing process. When consumers
visit, for example, a computer retailer's website (e.g., Dell.com or
CDW.com), they see a range of products and a range of options available
for those particular products. Consumers can then choose different types
of computers (e.g., notebook or desktop), choose from a range of colors
(e.g., tuxedo black or crimson), and choose particular specifications
(e.g., 3 gigabytes or 4 gigabytes of SDRAM).' Dell.com, for example,
already provides consumers with some options. That is, the website dis-
plays component options with corresponding prices for each option.8 As
consumers add components, Dell's website recalculates and updates the
price to reflect the particular options selected. Thus, consumers know the
approximate amount they will pay as they proceed through the computer
customization process.9 Given that companies already give consumers
the ability to customize orders through option selection, companies can
extend option-based purchasing to the formation of customized con-
tracts. '°
3. Critique of the Current Process and Benefits of Digital Dickering
Currently, many websites have boilerplate agreements that may be
difficult to find, and which are long and complicated. These boilerplate
agreements allow consumers no opportunity to negotiate or reject their
terms. That is, the boilerplate terms are part of the product and if con-
sumers want the product (e.g., a new computer), then they must accept
the boilerplate agreement." Dell, for example, provides a link (in small
7. See, e.g., The Dell Online Store: Build Your System, http://configure.us.dell.com]
dellstore/config.aspx?c=us&cs=19&l=en&oc=DYDWHR2&s=dhs (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
8. Id.
9. The amount is approximate because consumers generally have to pay shipping costs
as well. Those costs are not calculated until consumers enter their shipping information at the
end of the order process.
10. Dell could add another tab to their list or purchasing tabs that consumers could
click on and select the particular contract terminology. Making this process easy for the con-
sumer, however, would entail complicated programming by the corporations' programmers.
That is, it takes a lot of hard work to make the shopping process simple.
II. If the agreement is part of the product and the consumer does not have an opportu-
nity to read the agreement before purchasing the product, then the consumer could
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font) at the bottom of every screen to a boilerplate browsewrap "Terms
of Sale" agreement.' 2 When consumers click on the "Terms of Sale" link,
they are directed to Dell's Online Policies section.' From there, they
must figure out which of the several agreements listed applies to their
particular transaction. The notice at the top of the page reads: "Purchases
of Dell products and services are governed by one of the following terms
and conditions. Please review carefully."'' 4 Basically, unless consumers
look for the agreement, they would never even notice that it was on the
website. Once they find a link to the agreement webpage, they must de-
termine which agreement actually applies to their purchase. If sellers
used digital dickering, they could give their customers the opportunity to
select terms out of a range of pre-provided options, much like how they
select a color when they purchase a computer. Thus, consumers would
not need to search the sellers' website to find the terms, as the terms
would be integrated into the purchasing process. Having such integration
would alleviate confusion and reduce the likelihood that consumers will
not read the agreements at all.
Sellers may be willing to negotiate on some terms, but not others.
Companies may, for example, demand arbitration but be flexible as to
which organization they use for arbitration proceedings (e.g., National
Arbitration Forum or the American Arbitration Association). Some com-
panies may be flexible with Governing Law provisions.'" Companies
could, for example, break down their Governing Law provisions by issue
(e.g., contract or warranty dispute). Some states may have comparable
laws for particular types of issues and thus companies could allow con-
sumers to pick among those states for that particular issue.
6
hypothetically return the product. According to ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 E3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996), software is returnable if the consumer does not agree with the terms of the click-
wrap agreement. The fact that the contract had a statement telling consumers that software
was returnable was one of the main reasons why Judge Easterbrook upheld the agreement.
12. Dell, http://www.dell.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
13. Dell's Online Policies, http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/policy/en/
policyc=us&l=en&s=gen&-section=012 (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
14. Id.
15. Cf id. ("Governing Law. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THIS AGREEMENT,
ANY SALES THERE UNDER, OR ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE OR CONTROVERSY
(WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT, OR OTHERWISE, WHETHER PREEXISTING,
PRESENT OR FUTURE, AND INCLUDING STATUTORY, COMMON LAW, AND
EQUITABLE CLAIMS) BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND DELL arising from or relating to
this agreement, its interpretation, or the breach, termination or validity thereof, the relation-
ships which result from this agreement, Dell's advertising, or any related purchase SHALL BE
GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, WITHOUT REGARD TO
CONFLICTS OF LAWS.").
16. Governing Law provisions in contract agreements generally either list the state of
the consumer (e.g., Florida) or the state of the company location (e.g., Virginia). However, by
contract, parties can agree to litigate a dispute anywhere. Subject to public policy grounds,
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The goal of digital dickering is to reduce litigation for companies
while allowing consumers to make their own choices regarding contract
terms. Accordingly, an important component of digital dickering is to
give consumers a meaningful choice. That is, the range of acceptable
alternatives should truly be agreed upon by both parties. However, if
sellers insist on giving consumers only oppressive terms from which to
choose, then giving a digital dickering option would be meaningless, as
consumers will instead resort to litigation, rather than ultimately abiding
by the oppressive terms. In fact, courts may well refuse to uphold truly
oppressive terms. 7
III. THE DIGITAL DICKERING FRAMEWORK
People cannot negotiate with a computer. Thus, dickering, as tradi-
tionally viewed, where two parties haggle over terms, cannot work in the
online context because computers can only respond with pre-
programmed options. If dickering were to occur, programmers would
need to add capabilities to sellers' websites to allow consumers to select
from among the different terms while shopping on the seller's website.
Thus, digital dickering would require that sellers pre-select and pre-price
a range of acceptable terms.
Pricing out terms may be complicated; however, it is not impossible.
Actuaries specialize in calculating this type of risk exposure. 8 Similarly,
many other industries are equally competent to manage such risks; for
example, the reinsurance and automotive insurance industries make
these types of contract term decisions on a daily basis.
courts will generally uphold such explicit contract choices. Thus, companies could allow con-
sumers to pick any state to litigate a dispute. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.7 (2008).
17. In this context, boilerplate agreements are coming under closer scrutiny. Thus,
while consumers may still insist on litigating the terms they themselves have selected, compa-
nies would have a greater chance of having those terms upheld. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAw OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (Discussion Draft 2007) § 1.09 (highlighting that courts should
closely examine particular provisions when presented in a boilerplate agreement). See also Doe I
v. AOL LLC, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 875 *6 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the forum selection
clause in the boilerplate member agreement prescribing litigation in Virginia, which does not
allow consumer class actions, was unenforceable as to California plaintiffs because "Califor-
nia public policy is violated by forcing such plaintiffs to waive their rights to a class action
and remedies under California consumer law.").
18. About Casualty Actuarial Society, http://www.casact.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 25,
2009).
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A. The Reinsurance Industry
Reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.'9 In the reinsur-
ance industry, there are three parties: the primary insured (e.g., business
owner), the insurance company (generally called the "cedent"°), and the
reinsurance company (generally called the "reinsurer" 2'). For example,
the primary insured might purchase hurricane insurance from an insur-
ance company, such as MetLife, Inc., who would then purchase
insurance from a reinsurance company, such as Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.
Cedents generally purchase reinsurance as a hedge against catastrophic
losses, such as those incurred as a result of hurricanes, earthquakes, or
terrorist attacks. The reinsurer assumes a portion or all of the cedent's
risk in return for a portion of the premium the cedent collects from the
primary insured .
As discussed in Appleman on Insurance, reinsurance serves four
primary functions:
First, reinsurance enables the reinsured to limit its liability on
specific risks. Second, the use of reinsurance can stabilize the
loss experience of the reinsured. Third, reinsurance provides
protection against potentially catastrophic losses. Fourth, the use
of reinsurance allows the reinsured to write more coverage than
it would be able to in the absence of reinsurance.23
These four functions weigh differently in importance for each ce-
dent. Because cedents will have different risk management needs based
on the policies written for primary insureds, contracts between cedents
24and reinsurers are highly flexible. That is, parties to a reinsurance con-
tract can negotiate almost any term in a reinsurance agreement. Given
such contractual flexibility, reinsurance companies must have a way to
estimate the financial risk associated with a particular contractual term.
When business owners purchase insurance, they do so based on the
amount of coverage they believe they will require should something
happen to their business. Owners could purchase, for example, $1 mil-
lion worth of flood insurance or $500,000 worth of fire insurance.
Cedents know that if the business should burn down, they will have to
19. 14 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 102.1 (Eric Mills Holmes




23. Id. § 102.2.
24. DAVID R. CLARK, CAs. ACTUARIAL Soc'y, CAS EXAM STUDY NOTE: BASICS
OF REINSURANCE PRICING 1 (1996), available at http://www.casact.orglibrary/studynotes/
clark6.pdf.
Fall 20081
322 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:315
pay out $500,000 to the primary insured. Cedents, however, do not want
to keep $500,000 in the bank just in case the business burns down;
rather, they prefer to invest those funds to generate more capital for
themselves. Additionally, cedents want to provide policies for as many
business owners as possible but without keeping $500,000 in the bank
for each policy holder. Basically, cedents are overselling insurance poli-
cies. But they acknowledge that this type of overselling is risky because
a natural disaster could occur in a particular area, which would force
them to pay out on all the policies for that area. Accordingly, cedents
purchase policies from reinsurance companies to cover this risk. In turn,
reinsurance companies look at the amount of the primary policy, the
premium that the primary insured pays to the cedent and the amount of
reinsurance the cedent wants to purchase. Then, the cedent and the rein-
surance company negotiate a fee splitting agreement. In negotiating this
reinsurance contract, there is a struggle between the cedent and the rein-
surer. Both parties want to maximize their profit while at the same time
minimizing their risk. Thus, the two parties must negotiate to choose the
best contract terms among achievable alternatives." That is, there is
some point below which both parties will not go-the unachievable. But,
everything in between is up for negotiation.
There are many different ways to structure reinsurance policies: re-
insurance companies could share the risk equally or take on more risk
and receive a higher percentage of the premium. There are also many
different ways to calculate rates: surplus share, quota share, etc.26 In as-
sessing risk, actuaries take into account a wide variety of information
and make many assumptions. The most basic information used to calcu-
late rates are the bottom line numbers. That is, actuaries know the
amount of the policy payout should the accident actually occur and they
know the premium the primary insured is paying to the cedent. Addi-
tionally, actuaries take into account the likelihood of the accident
occurring.
There are a multitude of organizations that track events of all types.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), for example, tracks
the number of fires that occur each year.27 Actuaries use this basic data in
mathematical models to estimate the likelihood of a fire in a particular
25. See James N. Stanard & Russell T. John, Evaluating the Effect of Reinsurance Con-
tract Terms, LXXVII PRoc. OF THE CAs. ACTUARIAL SOC'Y I, 2 (1990), available at http:/I
www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed90/90001 .pdf.
26. Id. at 1-5 (noting that there are standard ratemaking procedures).
27. See National Fire Protection Association Fire Reports, http://www.nfpa.org/ (follow
"Research & Reports" hyperlink; then follow "Fire Statistics" hyperlink); See also Stephen G.
Badger, Large-Loss Fires for 2003, NFPA J., Nov.-Dec. 2004 ("In 2003, fire departments in
the United States responded to 1,584,500 fires"), available at http://findarticIes.com/p/articles
mi-qa3737/is_20041 I/ain9470906.
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area. Knowing the probability of the accident means that the reinsurance
company knows the probability that they will actually need to pay out on
the policy. If the probability is high, they can take more of the premium
to compensate for assuming the higher risk. If the probability is low,
then the cedent may not want to purchase reinsurance at all.
To determine the effect of particular contract terms, actuaries must
also take into account more complicated numbers. This information in-
cludes the present value of pre-tax cash flows; the effect of cash receipts
and payouts on the income statement and balance sheets; and the tax
impact of the particular cash flows.28 Using the bottom line numbers and
other numbers as input, actuaries develop sophisticated mathematical
models to allow reinsurance companies to price the risk assumed with
particular contractual terms. That is, by knowing the likelihood of a par-
ticular occurrence (e.g., a fire burning down a business) and the financial
impacts of particular terms (e.g., increases in tax payments because of
increases in cash flows), reinsurance companies know how much of the
premium they need to take on to compensate for this assumption of
risk. 9
B. Automotive Insurance
In the automotive industry, there are two parties: the person (or busi-
ness) purchasing auto insurance ("buyer") and the company providing
auto insurance ("seller"). Similar to the reinsurance industry, automotive
industry contracts are flexible because buyers have different insurance
needs (e.g., number of drivers in the family) and states have different
insurance requirements (e.g., mandatory personal injury protection).
Thus, automotive insurance companies, like reinsurance companies,
must have a way to estimate the financial risk associated with particular
contractual terms.
Actuaries serving the automotive industry have a great amount of
numerical input available to them. In an effort to track vehicle accidents,
the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) created the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) in 1975.30 Additionally, the National Center
28. Stanard & John, supra note 25, at 4-5.
29. This is a very brief overview of the reinsurance industry and the types of informa-
tion that actuaries consider. The mathematical calculations of actuaries are very complicated.
For a simplistic overview of actuarial mathematical techniques used in the reinsurance indus-
try, see CLARK supra note 24; for mathematical calculations of particular reinsurance contract
terms, see Stanard & John, supra note 25 (the authors only considered economic impact in
their calculations).
30. See FARS Encyclopedia, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.govMain/index.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2009) (statistics from 1994 through 2007). See also National Highway Traffic
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for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA) provides car accident breakdowns by
state, county, and even zip code.' Actuaries can, for example, ascertain
the number of alcohol-related car accidents in a particular zip code that
occurred on New Years Day.32 Thus, because they have such specific sta-
tistics, actuaries can estimate the probability of a car accident in a
particular area and automotive insurers can price their policies based on
where the buyer lives. Car insurance in Florida, for example, may be less
expensive than car insurance in Michigan because there is no snow in
Florida. Car insurance in Jacksonville, Florida may be cheaper still than
car insurance in Miami, Florida because the population in Jacksonville is
smaller than that of Miami and a smaller population means less conges-
tion and less potential for a car accident.
In addition to general environment statistical data, actuaries in the
13
automotive industry also consider characteristics specific to the person.
Insurance providers will ask, for example, a buyer's age, driving history,
number of family members in the household, number of miles driven per
week and school attendance.14 Insurance providers also require the re-
lease of credit reports which they use in assessing the profitability (i.e.,
recklessness) of particular individuals.35 The rationale is that people who
have a lot of debt may have a lot of stress in their lives and therefore will
not drive as carefully because of these distractions. Actuaries have even
Safety Administration, FARS Overview, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.
9fef9613e59b4dd24ec86eOdbaO46aO/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
31. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2007: A
COMPILATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH DATA FROM THE FATALITY ANALYSIS REPORTING
SYSTEM AND THE GENERAL ESTIMATES SYSTEM (EARLY EDITION) 45 tbl.24 (2008), available
at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/TSF2007EE.PDF (reporting number of crashes by time
of day, day of the week, and crash severity).
32. See Gregory L. Hayward, Mining Insurance Data to Promote Traffic Safety and
Better Match Rates to Risk, CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC'Y F. 31 (2002), available at http://
www.casact.org/pubs/forum/02wforum/02wf03l.pdf (discussing the use of data marts and
data mining technology to find the most significant risk characteristics and to adjust rate-
making).
33. See CHENG-SHENG PETER WU & JAMES C. GUSZCZA, STATE OF Mo. DEP'T OF
INS., DOES CREDIT SCORE REALLY EXPLAIN INSURANCE LOSSES? MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
FROM A DATA MINING POINT OF VIEW (2004) (criticizing the use of credit scores in both
automobile and housing insurance). Cf BRENT KABLER, STATE OF Mo. DEP'T OF INS., INSUR-
ANCE-BASED CREDIT SCORES: IMPACT ON MINORITY AND Low INCOME POPULATIONS IN
MISSOURI (2004) (criticizing the use of credit scores in both automobile and housing insur-
ance).
34. See Wo & GUSZCZA, supra note 33, at 116 ("Today, a typical personal auto rating
plan contains hundreds, if not thousands of classes involving ... territorial characteristics ...
vehicle use ... driver characteristics ... driving record ... [and] vehicle characteristics.").
35. See id. at 119 ("[T]oday more than 90% of insurance companies use credit scores or
credit information in one way or another.").
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suggested using personality tests to determine the accident proneness of
particular individuals.36
Similar to the reinsurance industry, actuaries in the automotive in-
dustry process all the numerical inputs and assess the risk of particular
individuals. In using this information, insurance companies can deter-
mine the amount they should charge to compensate for the risk they
assume in providing a particular class of individuals with insurance. That
is, male drivers below the age of twenty-four may be more likely to get
into a car accident than female drivers below the age of twenty-four.
Thus, male drivers below the age of twenty-four likely pay a higher pre-
mium than do female drivers below the age of twenty-four.37
The automotive insurance industry has been able to perfect their
ratemaking procedures to a point where they can give real-time insur-
ance quotes online. The quote procedure is similar to the procedure
employed by Dell.com when customizing a computer-the difference is
that the focus of the questions is on the person seeking automotive insur-
ance rather than computer specifications. If consumers go to
Progressive.com, for example, they are asked to provide: their name,
address, marital status, gender, date of birth, whether they own their pri-
mary residence, vehicle type, whether they own or lease their vehicle,
primary vehicle use, whether the vehicle has a security system and air-
bags, and whether they have any driver's license violations."
Additionally, the Progressive.com website requests consumers' so-
cial security numbers to allow them to run their credit report
immediately. Once the website retrieves the credit score, it processes all
the input, and returns an insurance quote. Thus, unlike the Dell.com
website, consumers do not have a real-time approximation of the cost of
their insurance as they progress through the selection process. Rather,
the quote is given at the final step in the process.
36. Ernest T. Berkeley, Accident Proneness Discussion Summary, XLVIII PROC. CAS.
ACTUARIAL SoC'Y, 207-08 (1961) (summarizing Dr. Leon Brody's comments noting that
much effort has be put into developing a personality test to assess accident proneness, as no
reliable test exists).
37. See, e.g., Are Men Better Drivers than Women?, INSURANCE.COM, Jan. 9,
2009, http://www.insurance.com/article.aspx/Are-MenBetterDriversThanWomen/artid/
259 ("Males aged 20 to 24 were more likely to die in an accident, while females aged 16-19
were slightly more likely to be killed than females 20-24. Many auto insurance industry ex-
perts would agree with the theory that males, especially young men, tend to drive more
aggressively than women and display their aggression in a direct manner, rather than indi-
rectly."). See also SEX DIFFERENCES IN DRIVING AND INSURANCE RISK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN THAT ARE RELE-
VANT TO THEIR DRIVING BEHAVIOUR, SOC. ISSUES RESEARCH CTR. (2004), http://
www.sirc.org/publik/driving.pdf.
38. See Progressive, http://www.progressive.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
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On the back end, Progressive has rates pre-determined for particular
classes of individuals.3 9 That is, a twenty-four-year-old male driver who
owns a 2000 Ford Escort 4-Door Sedan, rents an apartment in Detroit,
Michigan, and has a credit score of 650, may get a rate of $350 per
month. A forty-year-old female driver who owns her house in Detroit,
Michigan, drives a 2006 Toyota Camry 4-Door Sedan, and has a credit
score of 750, may get a rate of $150 per month. While the process is
real-time in the sense that consumers do get a quote at the end, the insur-
ance purchase is not final. Progressive reserves the right to double-check
all of the information entered by consumers and add in miscellaneous
surcharges or discounts.40 These discounts or surcharges reflect policy
characteristics or advances in vehicle technology.4' Common discounts
include a safe driver discount, homeowner discount, anti-theft discount,
and student driver discount (or surplus depending on the age and re-
cord) . Thus, while consumers have an estimate, automotive insurers
leave themselves room for further risk assessment and policy pricing
changes before giving a final price.
IV. CRITIQUES OF DIGITAL DICKERING
Given the examples provided above, it is apparent that estimating the
cost of particular contract terms is possible in certain situations. A few
industries have adapted the risk assessment results they receive from ac-
tuaries to the online context. Thus, through combining the contract term
analysis tools used in the reinsurance industry with the online experi-
ences of automotive insurance companies, it is possible that online
digital dickering is a feasible alternative to clickwrap and browsewrap
style agreements.
A. Efficiency and Cost
There are, however, several problems with implementing a digital
dickering system. One of these problems is overcoming the inherent
economic efficiency of boilerplate agreements. Another problem is ob-
taining the numerical inputs necessary to create a digital dickering
system.
39. See Wu & GUSZCZA, supra note 33, at 116-17.
40. Id. at 117.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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1. Efficiency of Boilerplate Agreements
Ideally, digital dickering would replace boilerplate agreements
which are used, in one form or another, by almost every website on the
Internet. Boilerplate agreements have become quite popular in part be-
cause they are economically efficient.43 That is, there is no negotiation
involved and companies do not need to explain the terms of the agree-
ment to potential consumers. Consumers can read the agreement at their
leisure and if they do not agree, return the product. Smaller companies
also find these agreements to be economically efficient because they can
free ride-they simply look to the bigger companies and copy their
terms.4
Replacing all the boilerplate agreements would be a time intensive
and expensive task because a digital dickering system would require a
great deal of back-end work. That is, companies would need a lot of in-
put data, actuaries to process the data, and then programmers to
implement the digital dickering systems on their websites. Additionally,
companies would need attorneys to read through and analyze contract
terminology and compare the benefits and burdens of the laws of multi-
ple states. Larger corporations, such as Microsoft, can afford these costs
but smaller corporations may not be able to bear the development costs
of a digital dickering system.
Furthermore, smaller companies would not be able to look to larger
competitors and free ride on their digital dickering systems because the
actuarial data and price rates may be company-specific. Microsoft, for
example, may be able to price their software products lower than Adobe
because Microsoft has a broader consumer base. On the other hand, Mi-
crosoft may be more prone to being sued because they are the largest
company in their industry and thus outsell their competitors. In consider-
ing these factors, actuaries at Microsoft would determine one pricing rate
while actuaries at Adobe would determine a different pricing rate.
Nonetheless, small companies may still be able to work around this
situation and continue to free ride off larger companies by following the
miscellaneous surcharges and discounts model used by the automotive
industry. If competitors' sales are 20 percent less than Microsoft's, for
example, then actuaries may add in a premium into their calculations to
account for possible rate differences.
43. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing benefits of
shrinkwrap agreements).
44. This free riding phenomenon, where smaller companies copy terms from market
leaders, can be seen in states copying regulations from market leaders. Many states, for exam-
ple, copy corporate regulations passed by Delaware which is often seen as the market leader
for corporate law. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy
in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998).
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2. Pricing and Input Problems
Another implementation problem with a digital dickering system is
that it may be difficult to obtain the necessary numerical inputs. Actuar-
ies in both the automotive industry and the reinsurance industry have
substantial numerical data readily available, which they can use as inputs
in risk assessment calculations. In both industries, there are numerous
organizational bodies (e.g., NFPA and DOT) gathering information,
45processing it, and feeding it back to the actuaries for further processing.
Additionally, many of these organizations have been gathering data for
years, allowing actuaries to make better assumptions because they can
see patterns more easily than they could without historically-reliable
data.
There is no "Association for Online Businesses" upon which com-
panies could rely on for specific data. Perhaps, though, this lack of
online-specific numerical data is not as problematic as it initially seems.
Generally, companies that have online businesses also have a brick-and-
mortar counterpart. That is, Progressive.com is an insurance company in
the insurance industry. Microsoft.com is a software company in the
software industry. Thus, each company can rely on its presence in the
underlying industry for the necessary data.
Companies may find it more problematic, however, to actually price
specific contract terms. While it is true that actuaries make many as-
sumptions in risk assessment calculations, both the automotive and the
reinsurance industries have at least some baseline upon which actuaries
can build: both industries know the amount of their exposure at the out-
set. If an automotive insurer writes a $500,000 policy, for example, it
knows that, at most, it may be responsible for paying out $500,000. Pric-
ing contract terms for digital dickering, however, is not necessarily this
simple because companies generally do not have a base amount upon
which they can build. While companies may attempt to limit their expo-
sure to the price of the product, not all states will allow such limitations
and, even if they do, such limitations may be overcome through litiga-
tion. 6
45. See supra notes 27, 30 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 910-13
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding contract term in boilerplate limiting damages to price paid for goods
to be unenforceable under Minnesota law because the limitation constituted an unreasonable
surprise to the plaintiff); Fontana Prods., Inc. v. Spartech Plastics Corp., 6 Fed. Appx. 591, 595
(9th Cir. 2001) (finding a damages waiver in a contract could not not limit defendant's liability
for fraud); Winchester v. Lester's of Minnesota, Inc., 983 F.2d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 1993) (re-
versing the district court and holding that, in a consumer transaction, a contract term limiting
damages to the price of the product is a "contractual exclusion of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose [and is thus] void under Kansas law.").
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In developing a digital dickering contract, companies would there-
fore need to consider what number(s) they would use as their baseline.
Companies could, for example, look to the amount they have spent on
lawsuits litigating particular contract terms. Companies such as Net-47 . 4
scape, Microsoft, 8 and Dell4 9 have been sued on either the content or
enforcement of their End User License Agreements (EULAs). Given that
companies are concerned about costs, they already track their legal ex-
penses."o Thus, these companies have internal data regarding expenses
incurred in handling particular lawsuits. Companies also have informa-
tion regarding the issues of each lawsuit. Therefore, they would know
whether a consumer was suing for a violation of a privacy clause or
whether the company was attempting to enforce an arbitration clause.
Actuaries could then be brought in to take a closer look at the data avail-
able and use them as input in calculating the risk of particular terms.
While this may be a difficult process for actuaries, as they will likely
have to make many assumptions, actuaries make similar assumptions
when calculating risk in any industry.
B. Consumer Demand and the Collective Action Problem
In both the reinsurance industry and the automotive industry, provid-
ers give choices because customers demand them. Customers are
demanding choices online as well. Internet consumers have access to a
wide variety of information about oppressive EULAs, specifically at
consumer-education websites.5' The Small Print Project, for example,
has gone so far as to draft an Anti-EULA:
READ CAREFULLY. By [accepting this materiallaccepting this
paymentlaccepting this business-cardiviewing this t-shirtlreading
this sticker] you agree, on behalf of your employer, to release me
47. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (Netscape sought to enforce an arbitration agreement included in a click-wrap license).
48. See, e.g., Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86148 (W.D. Wash.
2007) (Johnson alleged that Microsoft violated the Windows XP EULA by "surreptitious in-
stallation" of software).
49. See, e.g., Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 138 P.3d 826 (Okla. 2005) (Dell sought to
enforce an arbitration provision included with the invoice and acknowledgement sent with the
purchased computer); Complaint at 15-17, Intel Corp. v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co., 2009 WL 229670 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2009) (No. C09-00299 PVT) (disclosing
that Intel has exhausted $66 million from two insurers in contesting antitrust litigation).
50. See John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total Cost of Litigation Estimated at One-
Third Profits, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2008, at 28, available at http://
www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/February/28.pdf (estimating the total cost of litigation
to be $210 billion, which is "equivalent to one-third of the after tax profits of the Fortune
500").
51. See, e.g., The Small Print Project, http://smallprint.netzoo.net/reagl (last visited Jan.
9, 2009).
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from all obligations and waivers arising from any and all NON-
NEGOTIATED agreements, licenses, terms-of-service, shrink-
wrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, confidentiality, non-disclosure, non-
compete and acceptable use policies ("BOGUS AGREEMENTS")
that I have entered into with your employer, its partners, licensors,
agents and assigns, in perpetuity, without prejudice to my ongoing
rights and privileges. You further represent that you have the au-
thority to release me from any BOGUS AGREEMENTS on behalf
of your employer. 2
As consumers educate themselves about products and contracts, they
will shop around for the best deals and the most favorable terms.
Additionally, consumers will demand understandable contracts rather
than contracts full of complex and difficult to comprehend boilerplate
language. Once a critical mass of companies make efforts to provide
contract terms which are understandable to the public, consumers will
demand the same from other companies and will no longer settle for
boilerplate agreements. By allowing customers to select their terms and
making those terms understandable to the general public, companies will
simply be getting ahead of the curve.
Nonetheless, a collective action problem stands in the way. Many
people use the internet and it may be difficult to gather enough interested
people to demand that companies provide better terms. Moreover, people
may not be inclined to demand more favorable contract terms because
they are not aware of the oppressive contract terms (because they never
read the agreement), they have not had a problem with their purchase
and thus have no reason to be upset, or they simply believe that someone
else will address the issue. The extent of this problem, however, may be
exaggerated. Those interested in this issue can use social networking
websites, such as Facebook.com and MySpace.com, to reach out and
organize with others who may also be interested in this issue."
C. Demand for Reform
By allowing consumers to select the terms of their contracts, compa-
nies will increase the likelihood that their contracts will be upheld in
court. Courts have become more sophisticated about the Internet and
52. Id.
53. See e.g., David Canton, U.S. Race Reflects Facebook's Arrival as Political Force-
SOCIAL Networking: Activism has Found an Effective Medium, LONDON FREE PRESS (On-
tario), Jan. 12, 2009, at BM4 (discussing Obama's fundraising success through using
Facebook.com).
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software agreements, and although many courts have followed 1 Judge
Easterbrook's ProCD55 decision relating to shrinkwrap agreements, re-
cent courts have started to take a closer look at adhesive boilerplate
contracts. Recently, the California Court of Appeals struck down a provi-
sion in a cellular phone company's EULA requiring consumers to go
through arbitration to challenge termination fees.56 The Court held that
both the arbitration terms and the way that customers entered into the
EULA were unconscionable and, accordingly, the arbitration provision
was unenforceable. Interestingly, the Court dismissed T-Mobile's argu-
ment regarding market alternatives. T-Mobile argued that "there was no
oppression in the formation of the agreements because plaintiffs had the
option of obtaining mobile phone service from one of two other provid-
ers whose agreements did not contain class action waivers. 57 In
dismissing the argument, the court noted "that the evidence of the avail-
ability of market alternatives is exceedingly slim. More fundamentally,
we reject the contention that the existence of market choice altogether
negates the oppression aspect '5 8 of the contract. The Court's decision
highlights that it is not enough just to have market alternatives but that
the individual companies must give consumers legitimate choices.
Other organizations are also expressing concern over boilerplate
agreements limiting consumer rights. The American Law Institute (ALl),
for example, started a project in 2004 to "draft legal principles to guide
courts in deciding disputes involving transactions in software and to
guide the drafting of software contracts."5 9 In its preliminary draft, the
ALI notes that software contracts containing any of the following provi-
sions may be problematic: "(1) preclude the transferee generally from
making fair uses of the work; (2) ban or limit reverse engineering;
(3) restrict copying or dissemination of factual information; and
(4) forbid transfer of the software. "'
54. As of February 8, 2009, a LexisNexis Shepards report reflects that forty courts have
followed the decision.
55. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (software is returnable if
the consumer does not agree with the terms of the clickwrap agreement).
56. Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Cf
Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 233 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that where the
user had to "click" the "Yes, I agree to the above terms and conditions" button in order to
proceed with the online transaction, there was reasonable notice of the terms and mutual as-
sent to the contract).
57. Gatton, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 583.
58. Id.
59. American Law Institute, Current Projects, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=projects.proj-ip&projectid=9 (last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
60. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
§ 1.09 cmt.c (2008).
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Meanwhile, efforts to create a uniform standard for shrinkwrap and
browsewrap agreements have been rebuffed. The Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) is a proposed standard that would
create a uniform set of rules governing EULA's and online transactions. 6
The UCITA has been opposed by a number of consumer groups and at-
torneys general of several states because the Act is said to significantly
decrease consumer's rights and show overwhelming favoritism to com-
12 61panies.62 To date, only Virginia and Maryland have passed the Act.
If customers have the opportunity to select their terms, then it will be
much more difficult for them to later repudiate the contract. That is,
consumers will not be able to later claim that they did not read the terms
because the terms were hidden from them. Additionally, consumers will
be less likely to want to repudiate the contract because they will make
selections that best serve their needs. Companies may be concerned that
consumers will simply select the cheapest option. If that is a legitimate
concern, companies could follow the progressive.com model and simply
give a total price at the end rather than using the dell.com model and
pricing the terms as people select them.
Giving consumers the option to select terms assumes, of course, that
companies are giving customers a meaningful choice in the terms and
not just allowing them to select the least oppressive out of a set of oppres-
sive terms. It would be in a company's best interest to be fair when
drafting term choices because individual consumers, consumer-protection
groups, and attorney generals will litigate over oppressive terms and courts
will refuse to uphold them.6 Additionally, having favorable terms helps
the companies' reputations. Large corporations such as Microsoft are
already media targets, and there is heavy scrutiny when they engage in
practices that disfavor consumers.65 If large corporations use the digital
61. See Brian D. McDonald, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461 (2001) (discussing the history and politics of UCITA). See also
Pratik A. Shah, Note, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 85 (2000) (discussing the interaction of UCITA with state and federal intellectual
property laws).
62. See McDonald, supra note 61, at 466.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Barerra, 21 P.3d 395, 403 (Ariz. 2001) (holding
that the "exclusion [was] unenforceable here 'because of its technical wording and incon-
spicuous location within the policy boilerplate' "); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d
246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (consumer challenging arbitration clause in boilerplate agreement).
But see Kuehn v. Stanley, 91 P.3d 346, 354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial court
did not err in rejecting the Kuehns' claim that the disclaimer was unenforceable because the
disclaimer was not unconscionable, bizarre or oppressive).
65. In February 2007, for example, there were several reports in newspapers and blogs
regarding Microsoft campaigning to have a Russian school teacher imprisoned for using alleg-
edly pirated Windows software. See, e.g., Tom Zeller Jr., Gorbachev to Bill Gates: Show
Mercy for Accused 'Pirate', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/
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dickering process to oppress consumers, they will have negative public-
ity and their sales will likely suffer.66
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the digital dickering and price contracting processes are
possible and are already being used online in other contexts. Companies
must recognize this situation and give consumers more options when
contracting online because if they do not, consumers will simply stop
doing business with those entities which fail to offer an online dickering
model that provides real options. Consumers are already expressing
more concern about the inflexibility and alleged unfairness of boilerplate
terms. Finally, if companies do not begin to give consumers more op-
tions, courts and regulators will likely intervene to provide the necessary
consumer protections.
2007/02/05/gorbachev-to-bill-gates-show-mercy-for-accused-pirate/; Thomas Crampton,
Microsoft Spurns Appeal to Intervene in Russian Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at
C8; Teacher Spurns Microsoft's Offer to Settle Out of Court, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at
3.
66. See, e.g., Ripoff Report: Don't Let Them Get Away with It ... Let the Truth Be
Known!, http://www.ripoffreport.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) ("Many law firms and law
enforcement agencies utilize Ripoff Report to aid in their investigations of business prac-
tices."); Hell: The Web's #1 Dell Complaint, http://ihatedell.net (last visited Jan. 25, 2009);
Paul, Why Dell Sucks Today, WIZBANG, May 10, 2006, http://wizbangblog.comcontent/2006/
05/10/why-dell-sucks-today.php. See also Laurie J. Flynn, Dell's Profit Drop Surprises Inves-
tors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at C4.
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